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Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings 
together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with 
their theory, but instead offer 3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying con- 
sumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an 
understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus 
inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to 
Higgin's (1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity 
principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the 
regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive under- 
pinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counterfactual thinking. 
In their regret regulation theory 1 .O, Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2007) offer a theoretical synthesis that brings together a 
range of concepts and findings spanning numerous litera- 
tures, all centering in one way or another on the construct of 
regret. Intriguingly, they label their theory version 1.0, thus 
acknowledging exciting prospects for future revision in 
light of the fervent research attention that the concept of 
regret continues to garner. Computer software is routinely 
labeled with such numbers, with whole versus decimal 
numbers signifying larger versus smaller revisions. The ear- 
liest hacker spirit of the 1960s emphasized a communal 
spirit, in which software code written (on paper!) on one 
particular day would be left in a file drawer for another pro- 
grammer to improve upon the next day, a vivid embodiment 
of the core values of science itself (Levy, 2001). We hope 
that the ideas and suggestions contained in the present com- 
mentary are accepted in a similar collaboratory spirit. 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) explicitly frame their the- 
ory as an integration of previously understood principles. 
They have done an admirable job of bringing together many 
diverse observations, and we applaud rather than dispute 
their main conclusions. Nevertheless, their synthesis 
involves substantial subjective interpretation, necessitated 
by the embryonic state of the literature. In the remainder of 
this commentary, we emphasize three theoretical points that 
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our own subjective interpretation deems essential to an 
understanding of regret in its consumer decision-making 
context. 
BEHAVIOR REGULATION VERSUS REGRET 
REGULATION 
People regulate their regrets, as they regulate all of their 
emotions. True though this may be, to focus on regret regu- 
lation is to miss the larger theoretical picture. Regret regula- 
tion is secondary to behavior regulation, which refers to the 
ongoing management of effective daily behavior. Emotion 
is merely a signal, one of many inputs into the regulatory 
loop governing single and sequential actions that together 
ensure survival and success (Roese, Sanna, & Galinsky, 
2005; Roese & Sherman, in press). Consumers are certainly 
motivated to avoid regret, but this is simply a byproduct of 
their more basic desire to avoid bad products and poor ser- 
vice. Consumers reverse their prior decisions not to elimi- 
nate regret so much as to attain better outcomes. People 
regulate regret in order to regulate behavior. 
Does this render the title of Zeelenberg and Pieter's 
(2007) theory a misnomer? Not entirely. Like any negative 
emotional state, individuals are motivated to reduce regret, 
and this observation explains a wide range of findings. Yet 
placing this observation within the larger perspective of 
behavior regulation clarifies broader patterns which may be 
especially useful to researchers in consumer decision mak- 
ing. Our next two comments exemplify this prospect. 
MOTIVATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
ACTION-INACTION DISTINCTION: 
REGULATORY FOCUS 
To do or not to do, that is the question of Zeelenberg and 
Pieter's (2007) Proposition 7. Much research has examined 
the distinction between regrets of action versus inaction. In 
a nutshell, people may kick themselves for doing something 
(buying stock in Enron just before it tanked) or not doing 
something (missing out on buying stock in Google before it 
took off). The earliest research asked the question of which 
kind of regret predominates (answer: it depends); later 
research specified moderator variables (e.g., temporal per- 
spective, decision justifiability). Such research assumes that 
the functional consequences (i.e., processes of subsequent 
regulatory activity) are equivalent for regrets of action ver- 
sus action, hence the question is simply which combination 
of situational variables serve to intensify regret per se. 
Importantly, however, these two kinds of regret do 
appear to differ qualitatively in terms of their motivational 
implications. Regrets of action tend to center on avoidance, 
whereas regrets of inaction tend to center on approach. This 
connection may be phrased in terms of Higgin's (1998) the- 
ory of regulatory focus, which has recently been applied 
fruitfully to diverse topics in consumer psychology (e.g., 
Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, & Nataraajan, in press; Jain, 
Agrawal, & Maheswaran, in press; Keller, in press). In 
these terms, we may differentiate between promotion failure 
(e.g., not being able to attain a desired product or situation) 
versus prevention failure (e.g., not being able to bypass a 
undesirable product or situation). Lee and Aaker (2004) 
showed that advertising is more persuasive if it is framed so 
as to match the situationally varying regulatory focus of the 
perceiver. Advertising keyed to "acquiring great looks and 
exceptional engineering" is more effective when the audi- 
ence is in a promotion focus, whereas advertising that 
emphasizes "getting stranded by not having the emergency 
road and safety kit" (p. 205) is more effective when the 
audience is in a prevention focus. 
Regrets of inaction are more likely to be activated when 
the individual has suffered a promotion failure, but regrets 
of action are more likely when the individual has suffered a 
prevention failure (Pennington & Roese, 2003a; Roese, 
Hur, & Pennington, 1999; Roese et al., 2006). In large part 
this pattern stems from a simple matching of normative 
expectancies. People tend to see positive outcomes as a 
result of their deliberate acts, hence failing to reach a 
desired positive state creates a regret focusing on specific 
acts or decisions that should have been taken to have 
achieved that positive state. By contrast, people tend to look 
at an accident (or other prevention failures) in terms of 
avoiding them by deleting an inappropriate decision or 
action. Promotion and prevention focus may themselves 
elicit regrets of inaction and action, respectively. Moreover, 
a focus on the distant (as opposed to recent) past or future 
tends to involve both an emphasis not only on regrets of 
inaction (as opposed to action), but also on promotion fail- 
ures or promotion goals in general (as opposed to preven- 
tion goals; Pennington & Roese, 2003b; see also Bums & 
Roese, in press). 
That the action-inaction regret distinction holds distinct 
motivational implications opens many doors to new 
research in consumer psychology. Two possibilities seem 
evident. First, knowing that consumers are sometimes dis- 
satisfied, advertising might be framed in terms of promotion 
or prevention concerns so as to match, and assuage, the pre- 
dominant form of regret involved with the particular prod- 
uct in question. Second, advertising might actually 
emphasize regret of either action or inaction, then recom- 
mend specific actions geared to either eagerness (i.e., pro- 
motion) or vigilance (i.e., prevention). 
FROM REGRET TO BEHAVIOR: THE 
OPPORTUNITY PRINCIPLE 
What comes of regret? Under Proposition 10, Zeelenberg 
and Pieters (2007) argue that the consequences of regret fall 
into three main categories, centering on decision, alterna- 
tives, or feelings. These categories are certainly sensible in 
that they capture the variation in content of past research 
efforts. But they do little to suggest any higher order princi- 
ple that systematizes distinct functional principles. We sug- 
gest that another distinction, itself borrowed from prior 
theory, does a better job of illuminating the consequences 
not only of regret but of any negative emotional experience. 
It will be obvious that this recommendation is a further 
instantiation of the idea that behavior regulation, and not 
regret or emotion regulation per se, is the primary regula- 
tory enterprise of human brains. 
When people experience threat, either physical or psy- 
chological, they can respond in two different ways (Roese & 
Olson, in press). One is behavioral: The individual directly 
acts on the threat to reduce or avoid it (e.g., runs away 
from a predator; reverses a questionable decision; searches 
for a new romantic partner). The other is cognitive: The 
individual mentally reconstrues the circumstances so as to 
put it in a better light (e.g., deflects blame from the self; 
derogates a rejected option; thinks optimistically about the 
future). These two categories have been distinguished in a 
variety of literatures; for example, stress researchers 
labeled them problem-focused coping versus emotion- 
focused coping (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984); in the lit- 
erature on attitudinal responses to threatening persuasive 
appeals, they have been labeled danger-control and fear- 
control (e.g., Leventhal, 1970). Gilbert and Ebert (2002) 
suggested a temporal ordering, such that behavioral reme- 
diation is the default: "When suboptimal outcomes 
threaten a person's satisfaction, the first line of defense is 
to change the outcome, and it is only when such efforts 
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prove futile that . . . the person's subjective experience [is 
actively modified]" (p. 504). 
Within Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) list of regret con- 
sequences, only one is behavioral: undo or reverse decision. 
We argue that this is the primary, pivotal, and default 
response. Buy a different product next time. Educate your- 
self about product lines and feature options. Expose your 
mind to more (or less!) information relevant to the decision. 
Don't go to that restaurant anymore. The behavioral 
response is about acting to improve the current circum- 
stance in an ongoing manner. We argue that regret serves 
primarily as a motivational kick toward further action and 
future betterment, one that is largely implicit, or hidden 
from conscious recognition (Roese, 2005). All the remain- 
ing regret consequences outlined by Zeelenberg and Pieters- 
justify decision, deny responsibility, reappraise alternatives, 
psychological repair work, and regret suppression-are 
simply instances of cognitive reconstrual. In a different era, 
all would have been bundled under the heading of cognitive 
dissonance reduction. 
When is the behavioral versus cognitive response more 
likely? The opportunity principle (Roese & Summerville, 
2005) describes the surprising notion that regrets are more 
intense when opportunities exist for further action, or more 
specifically, for further rectification of current problems. 
Where opportunity is denied, or where problematic circum- 
stances are inevitable, cognitive reconstrual (dissonance 
reduction) is activated to minimize the regret experience 
(i.e., to make the individual feel better). Accordingly, regret 
persists in precisely those situations in which opportunity 
for positive action remains high. Consistent with our main 
point that regret regulation subserves behavior regulation, 
regret itself spurs further corrective action. Regret motivates 
people toward revised decision making and corrective 
action that often bring improvement in life circumstances 
(Nasco & March, 1999; Roese, 1997, 1999; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 1999). 
Roese and Summerville (2005) were the first to stitch 
together the diverse strands of previous work that had sup- 
ported the opportunity principle, yet which had never 
before been glimpsed as part of the same underlying con- 
cept (see pp. 1274-1275). Some of that prior research cen- 
tered on regret specifically, some on counterfactual 
thinking, and some on disappointment or negative affect 
more generally. This principle helps to settle a huge ques- 
tion: When does regret occur? Regret theorists want to 
believe that regret is an inevitable consequence of the act 
of deciding, yet the cognitive dissonance tradition sug- 
gested that regret is often absent, because it is has been 
actively quashed. More recent research shows that the pos- 
itive aspects of the chosen option are better remembered 
than the negative aspects, with the reverse characterizing 
unchosen options (Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000, 
2003). Roese and Summerville argued that the opportunity 
principle helps finally to reconcile regret theory with 
dissonance theory, by pointing out the circumstances 
under which each prevails. 
CODA: REGRET OR COUNTERFACTUAL? 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) echoed previous theorists in 
defining regret as a counterfactual emotion. We conclude 
by noting the false division between regret and counterfac- 
tual, as constructs but also as literatures. Some theorists 
believe that these terms reference affect and cognition, 
respectively, but in an important essay, Sabini and Silver 
(2005) pointed out the inherent ambiguity in theorizing on 
the basis of self-reports rooted to lay emotion. If regret is 
defined for research subjects during an experiment, this def- 
inition cannot but look very much like the definition of 
upward, self-focused counterfactual thinking (e.g., "to what 
extent do you wish that your decision had been different so 
that you could have obtained a better outcome?'). If both 
regret and counterfactual are measured via the lens of verbal 
self-report, their operational distinction is necessarily and 
unavoidably blurred. 
We raise this point only because several of our own theo- 
retical observations derived from a balanced appraisal of 
research reports with titles mentioning both regret as well as 
counterfactual thinking. The primacy of behavior regula- 
tion, for example, was recognized in earlier theory on the 
functional basis of counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1994, 
1999, 2000, 2005; Roese & Olson, 1997; Roese et al., 
2005). Regulatory focus theory was initially connected to 
counterfactuals (Roese et al., 1999), but subsequent 
research used self-reports in which "regret" was explicitly 
named to subjects, with precisely the same result (Roese 
et al., 2006, Study 2). Finally, the initial glimmer of the 
opportunity principle appeared in a study of counterfactual 
thoughts evoked by gambling outcomes (Markman, Gavanski, 
Sherman, & McMullen, 1993), yet the same principle was 
evident in studies of action-inaction regrets (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1994), and in a new experiment that focused on 
participants' biggest regrets in life (Roese & Summerville, 
2005, Study 2b). As such, we urge researchers studying 
regret in consumer contexts to consult the published litera- 
ture with searches using both regret and counterfactual as 
separate keywords (Roese, 2000). 
To conclude, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) have done 
the study of consumer decision making an enormous ser- 
vice by pulling together diverse conceptual strands into 
their regret regulation theory version 1.0. They have 
done a remarkable job and we have no substantive quib- 
bles with their interpretation of the meaning of past find- 
ings. We do believe, however, that the overall arc of any 
regret theory must be situated within an understanding of 
behavior regulation. Regret, like all emotion, is a regula- 
tory signal feeding into the management of effective 
ongoing behavior. 
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